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0.	  Introduction	  
It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation 
(e.g. Hartman 1996). Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of 
computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in 
astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? As a 
substitute, computer simulation should be an alternative means to achieve some identical 
end. In the weakest sense, it may simply mean that simulation produces information. But 
there is a much stronger and challenging possible interpretation of the notion of epistemic 
substitute that is the object of this paper. On this interpretation, simulation is construed as 
‘epistemically on a par’ with experimentation. Computer simulation, as epistemic 
substitute, can be a different means to learning the same thing, that is, what we would 
have learnt with experimentation had experimentation be possible. Recent comparative 
analyses of the methodology and epistemology of computer simulation and 
experimentation offer some support for this view (Winsberg 2009, Morrison 2009, 
Norton and Suppe 2001). And, even though the strength of this support will be called into 
question, these studies show two things that really motivate this paper: 1) that this view 
cannot be simply taken for granted nor easily rejected and 2) that what is at issue is not 
only the epistemic function of simulation but also that of experimentation and the relation 
between the two. 
A guiding intuition throughout will be that in experimentation, the system under study is 
interacted with and given the opportunity to somehow express itself via a causal effect on 
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the instruments. In simulation, by contrast, what is expressed in the results is the model 
used in the simulation, assumed here, in the case of computer simulation, to be a 
mathematical model. Apparently, the epistemic distinction is clear: experimentation 
produces information about how the system behaves; simulation produces information 
about a model. Experimental results call for a model to explain the data that are 
produced. Simulation shows what data could be explained by a given model, the one used 
in the simulation. As we will see, however, this quick comparison, is, well, too quick. 
Closer inspection reveals significant methodological and epistemological similarities 
between simulation and experimentation that preclude hasty conclusions. If there is a 
basis to distinguish the epistemic function of simulation and experimentation, it is not in 
the appearances that might feed our intuition.  
The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two 
powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically 
on a par’. One is based on the claim that, in experimentation, no less than in simulation, it 
is not the system under study that is manipulated but a system that ‘stands-in’ for it. The 
other one highlights the pervasive use of models in experimentation.  
It will be argued that these arguments, as compelling as they might seem, are each based 
on a mistaken interpretation of experimentation and that, far from simulation and 
experimentation being epistemically on a par, they do not have the same epistemic 
function, do not produce the same kind of epistemic results. If that is so, comparing the 
epistemic power of these activities yields limited return. Rather we need to get clearer on 
the differences between their epistemic functions so as to better understand how these 
functions co-operate in the investigation of a given system. Some suggestions about the 
main elements of this co-operation will be given and illustrated at the end of the paper. 
 
1.	  Basics:	  simulation,	  experimentation	  
Let’s start with some elementary characterization of experimentation and simulation that 
can be used as uncontroversial basis for a more precise and, maybe controversial, 
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characterization of the way these activities function as epistemic instrument: instrument 
to produce information.  
Experimental knowledge claims are based on instrumental interactions with a physical 
system. What sort of claims they are, what they are about, what the relation is between 
what they are about and what is manipulated, are questions we will come back to later. 
Most generally and minimally, for now, experimentation on a physical system S can be 
thought of as a procedure that consists in, at least:  
1) Preparing the system S in a certain state, by fixing initial and boundary 
conditions, and selectively putting under control the parameters that have an 
effect on the outcomes of measurement, the active parameters.2 
2) Letting the system evolve. The evolution of S is characterized by the evolution of 
a set of physical quantities characterizing the state of S, the state variables. 
3) Recording the evolution of S through a sequence of states when the values of 
some of these parameters are varied; analyzing the results.  
 “Computer simulation” is used in two main senses3 often not clearly distinguished:  
1) simulation of a mathematical model, that is, a computer-implemented 
procedure that solves an approximation of a system of equations; 
2) simulation of a physical system S, that is, a computer-implemented procedure 
of imitation, mimicking the evolution of S as a result of the implementation of 
a mathematical model of S. 
In both senses, the simulation involves a process undergone by a computer, a 
computational process. Hereafter, as is commonly done, I will take this latter sense of 
simulation as having the former sense built in. When one speaks of the computer 
simulation of, say, a fluid mechanical system, it is presupposed that the simulation of this 
physical system is realized by carrying out a computer simulation of a system of 
equations that represents the evolution of the fluid mechanical system, that is, of a 
mathematical model of this physical system.  	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Often attached to the notion of simulation is the idea of “experimenting with a model” 
(Ören 2011). Unsurprisingly, this aspect of simulation will prove relevant to the 
comparison of the epistemic functions of simulation and experimentation.  
But before going further, it is useful to clarify what is at issue when we compare the 
epistemic functions of simulation and experimentation. We are not comparing simulation 
and experimentation ‘in general’. What needs to be compared is what can be learned 
about a given system. Of course, that cannot be done when experimentation is not 
possible. But it can be done for cases, probably the most current, where simulation and 
experimentation are used in tandem, that is, where they are directed at the same system S 
under study. The use of simulation in tandem with experimentation seems to capture less 
philosophical interest than its use where experimentation is not possible. But this kind of 
use is the most appropriate for a comparison of epistemic functions because it enables us 
to put their epistemic results, so to speak, side-by-side. And there is no reason why the 
conclusions from this configuration about epistemic functions would not be of relevance 
to the case where experimentation is not possible.  
The tandem configuration has an additional virtue. Simulation has a multiplicity of 
epistemic functions. They are not all relevant to our concern. We are specifically 
concerned with the use of simulation in the investigation of system that could be, in 
principle, object of experimental investigation, and with the epistemic function of 
simulation associated with this sort of use. The tandem configuration enables us to zoom 
in on this epistemic function. 
 
2.	  Simulation	  as	  experimentation	  
The idea that simulation is a form of experimentation plays substantial role in the view 
that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’, so it is worth making it 
clearer.  
Following our above minimal characterization of experimentation, simulation can be 
analyzed into three similar sub-processes: 
1) The preparation of a system: it consists in the transformation of a set of initial 
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equations into an algorithm suitable for computation given certain constraints of 
time, computational power, and accuracy (Winsberg 2003), and the 
implementation on the computer of this algorithm, the simulation model, with an 
assignment of numerical values to constants and parameters. 
2)  The evolution of the system: the autonomous transformation over time of the 
physical system that implements the computation (Humphreys 1994; Norton and 
Suppe 2001). It may be argued that, in a certain sense, the model that is simulated 
also undergoes a transformation (Krohs 2008)4. 
3) The third is the recording, organization, and classification of the results in the 
form of models of the data (Winsberg 2003). 
 
That simulation is a form of experimentation is an important ingredient in the discussion 
but it is not determining. It is not determining because we need to know how this form of 
experimentation, by contrast to what is traditionally identified as experimentation, relates 
to the system under study, the target system. But it is important because how it relates to 
this system will depend on what sort of activity it is. To take it that we can start with a 
clear distinction between simulation and ‘what is traditionally identified as 
experimentation’ may seem to be begging the question in favor of a distinction between 
these activities and their epistemic functions. It may turn out that on closer inspection at 
least some of these distinctions will vanish as illusory. But that we generally use the 
terms ‘simulation’ and ‘experimentation’ to distinguish two kinds of activities would 
remain (Winsberg 2009). If we were not able, whatever the basis for it, to make such a 
distinction, the question of the comparison would not even arise. What is questioned is 
what these activities consist in, in particular regarding experimentation. So I will propose 
a distinction between simulation and experimentation which will have decisive 
consequences regarding their epistemic function, but rather than begging the question I 
take this contrast to be an offer to be ‘put to the test’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  There may be something unsettling about speaking in this way of the transformation of the model 
simulated. But it becomes quite intuitive if one considers that the simulation produces a series of sets of 
values forming different realizations of the simulation model, in the same way as, say, a series of values of 
temperature would characterize different states of the same fluid system. 
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The starting point of the discussion is a system S under investigation and a conception of 
simulation as experimenting on a model of the system S. The immediate results of the 
simulation are sets of values that are successive realizations of the model. In that sense, 
they are about the object manipulated, the model. By contrast, it is proposed that 
experimentation results come directly from a manipulation of and causal interaction with 
the system S itself. In this sense of causally mediated relation, experimentation comprises 
a ‘direct access’ to S. It is anticipated that a causally mediated relation with S should 
enable experimentation to produce information about S that the manipulation of a model 
of it might not be able to produce.  In the next section, I will discuss two arguments against the distinction between 
simulation and experimentation in terms of direct access to the system under study.  
3.	  False	  similarities	  
There are two main objections to the idea that direct access to the target system 
distinguishes experimentation from simulation:  
1) no more than simulation does experimentation consist in the actual manipulation of the 
system of interest;  
2) experimentation no less than simulation involves the use of and dependence on 
models.  
It is important for the discussion to be clear on the different elements that are involved in 
simulation and experimentation for, as we will see, there are some distinctions that are 
not always made and are crucial to the issue.  
An epistemic activity such as simulation or experimentation is specifically designed to 
produce information about a certain system: its target system.  Both in experimentation 
and simulation, the investigation of a given system involves manipulating a certain 
object: the object manipulated.  In the case of a simulation, that the target system, 
whose behavior is simulated, and the object manipulated in the simulation, the model 
implemented on the computer, are distinct, is not controversial. 
In addition to these notions, common in recent studies on simulation and 
experimentation, we need two new concepts.  In either simulation or experimentation 
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there is certain information about the target system that the procedure aims to obtain:  its 
epistemic target.  This needs to be taken narrowly. Suppose that the motivation for some 
research is to find out the effect of a certain drug on humans, while the experiment is 
conducted on rats.   The effects of the drug on rats are reported as the research result: that 
was the epistemic target.  But the epistemic motivation for the study was to obtain 
information concerning effects on humans.  At the cost of multiplying terms we might 
speak of a motivating ‘remote’ target system and a motivating ‘remote’ epistemic target.   
These might be mentioned in the original grant proposal or in an introductory paragraph 
of the eventual journal article, but will have to be distinguished from the actual reported 
or hoped for research result. 
3.1	  Experimentation	  doesn’t	  manipulate	  the	  system	  of	  interest	  either?	  
As we said, the object manipulated in a simulation and the target system of the simulation 
are clearly distinct. The question is whether there is such a distinction between object 
manipulated and target system in the case of experimentation. According to Francesco 
Guala (2008), there is a “ ‘representative analogy’ between experiments and models: both 
stand for some other system, or set of systems, that is the ultimate target of 
investigation”. Similarly, Eric Winsberg (2009) argues that both in simulation and in 
experimentation, results about the target system will be inferred from the results about the 
object that was manipulated. Guala locates the difference between simulation and 
experimentation in “the kind of relationship existing between, on the one hand, an 
experimental and its target system, and, on the other, a simulating and its target system”: 
“the mapping in a simulation is purely formal, whereas experiments are materially 
analogous to their target system”. For Winsberg, the relevant distinction is strictly 
epistemological, in the kinds of justification supporting the inference from the result of 
the manipulation to claims about the target system, but with no reason to believe that 
experimentation is “epistemically more powerful than simulation” (Winsberg 2009:591).  
Winsberg makes a compelling argument to the effect that if in experimentation, just as in 
simulation, what is manipulated is a system standing in for the target system, there is no 
basis for drawing a principled distinction between the epistemic functions of simulation 
and experimentation. But the premise of the argument, that in both cases what is 
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manipulated is a system standing in for the target system, is questionable. First, it does 
not seem to be necessarily the case in experimentation, by contrast with simulation, that 
the system manipulated is different from the target system. And secondly, when the two 
are distinct in an experiment, the relation between them is different from what it is in the 
case of a simulation.  
Regarding the first point, the distinction between system manipulated and target system 
finds its intuitive motivation in the observation that what we want to learn about is the 
world but the world is too complex to be manipulated. We want to learn about wakes 
around islands or wings or poles, but we manipulate tame wakes around polished 
cylinders in shielding laboratories. We want to learn about human reactions to drugs, but 
we manipulate rats. The system manipulated, it then seems, is not the one we really want 
to learn about. On the basis of this distinction, Guala (2003) distinguishes the problem of 
internal validity from the problem of external validity. The former is related to the 
validity of inferences about the system manipulated whereas the latter concerns the 
validity of inferences about the target system on the basis of the results about the system 
manipulated.  
Interestingly, however, Guala (2008) notes that “experimental physicists do not recognize 
external validity as a separate problem of inference”, and more generally, that “[i]t should 
be stressed that experimenters are often concerned with proving the existence of certain 
mechanisms or phenomena in the lab only, and leave it to policy-makers or applied 
economists to apply such knowledge in the field”. But if scientists are not concerned with 
drawing inferences about the system ‘in the field’, then it seems inappropriate to take this 
system to be the target system. The idea here is not to regiment the use of a term. Rather, 
it is that if we are to compare the epistemic functions of simulation and experimentation, 
we should better make sure that the term ‘target system’ picks out the same system for 
simulation and experimentation when they are used in tandem. The target system of the 
simulation is the system represented by the model manipulated: it is the system which the 
simulation is designed to produce information about. It is this system that needs to be 
identified as target system of the experimentation as well. And if that is so, the system in 
the field is not the target system of experimentation, not in the sense in which the target 
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system of the simulation is the system that is represented by this model used in the 
simulation.  
The confusion at the source of this misidentification of the target system of 
experimentation is the lack of distinction between the target system, identified clearly 
through the reported research results, and the epistemic motivation. The latter certainly 
motivates the procedure and the epistemic function of this motivation is important. Still, 
going back to the experimental study on rats, the motivation for such a study is, we said, 
human reaction to the drug. The same experimentation might have had a different 
motivation. And the same experimental results might even turn out to be unexpectedly 
informative about systems different from the original motivation. On the other hand, the 
same epistemic motivation may motivate different sorts of experimental study, 
manipulating different systems. 
To illustrate this distinction, let’s introduce briefly a particular experimental study in 
fluid mechanics, which will be used again in the next section to compare the epistemic 
functions of experimentation and simulation. A classic object of study in fluid mechanics 
is the wake that forms behind a blunt obstacle. Wakes are found everywhere in nature, 
behind islands, rocks, poles, wings. In a laboratory, it is typically created by placing a 
cylinder perpendicular to the upstream direction of a flow and increasing the velocity of 
the flow. Beyond a certain threshold of the control parameter vortices are emitted 
periodically behind the cylinder and form a wake flowing downstream  (see e.g. 
Williamson 1989). 
Some of these experiments aimed to specify the evolution of the shedding frequency of 
the vortices with the control parameter. That is what the results published as conclusion 
of the study were about, and they were about the system that was manipulated. This 
system is the one under study, the target system. Of course, these results may be used for 
new studies interested, for instance, in what happens behind coupled wakes in a lab, or in 
what happens behind an island, in the field. The system envisaged for further application 
might have been an epistemic motivation for the experimentation that was conducted. But 
those uses of the results would pertain to a different experimental enterprise.  
Draft	  under	  review	   	   Isabelle	  Peschard	  July	  2010	  
	   10	  
More will be said later about what exactly we learn from these results—the reported 
research results do not include merely incidental features of the very particular system 
that was manipulated. If there is no artifact in the results, we learn something about any 
system that is relevantly similar to the one that is manipulated. This is what 
reproducibility and reliability are all about. But the point remains that in these 
experiments the object manipulated and target system coincide.  
What is then the target system of the experimentation? Just as in simulation, it is what the 
procedure of manipulation is specifically designed to learn about. It is what the 
conclusions of the experimental study are about, which is different from the speculations 
they may encourage. It is the system that is manipulated; at least it is so in a large number 
of cases, and especially in physics. 
That may not, however, always be the case. There are cases of experimentation where 
object manipulated and target system do not coincide: typically, when the system 
manipulated is a sample from a population about which the manipulation is designed to 
make conclusions.  
Take, for instance, the investigation of conditional reasoning in cognitive psychology. A 
typical experimental set up for this investigation is the Wason task. Subjects are shown 
four double-sided cards, showing the symbols A, K, 2, 7.  They are told that each card 
has a number on one side and a letter on the other. The subjects are asked which cards 
need to be turned over in order to test or falsify the hypothesis that “if there a vowel on 
one side, there is an even number on the other” (Wason 1968). It is clear that on the basis 
of the experimental results, scientists draw conclusions that go well beyond the 
individuals who performed the task. The procedure is rather similar to polls probing some 
features of a population. Under the assumption that the sample is representative of the 
whole, the results are about the whole population.  In this case, the former seems to 
qualify as much as the latter for the status of target system5. One may well say that being 
representative amounts to standing in, in the way that in a simulation the model stands in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Note that in the case of the wake also one could speak of the particular system that was manipulated as 
representative of something else: a class. But a class doesn’t fit well the role of target system whereas in the 
Wason experiment, the system manipulated is representative of another system: the whole population from 
which the sample is taken.	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for the system it is a model of. But there is an important difference though: the model is 
not representative of the system it represents, it is meant to be a representation of it.   
Mary Morgan (2003) already pointed out this distinction between being a representation 
and being representative. The distinction is between two different ways in which a system 
may stand in for another: by contrast to being a representation, the system that is 
representative of another is only different from it in the way that a part is different from 
the whole. Morgan speaks of the representative as being ‘of the same stuff’ as what it is 
representative of. ‘Being of the same stuff’ should be taken literally: ‘being a part of’. 
Wendy Parker (2009) argues that material similarities between the system manipulated 
and the target system are not necessarily more informative than the formal similarities 
relied upon in simulation, between the target system and a model of it. This is true. But 
what is important in the idea of ‘being of same stuff’ is not the idea of a different type of 
similarities; it is the idea that what is manipulated is not a different sort of system. It is 
rather a sub-system.  
Winsberg (2009)’s analysis of the epistemological consequences of the difference 
between manipulating a model and manipulating an experimental system still applies: the 
justifications for the results will be of different sorts. But more importantly for our 
concern, there will be consequences of the difference between manipulating a 
representation and manipulating a representative of the target system. And these 
consequences are epistemic. They have to do with what we can learn about the target 
system. 
There is finally another case of experimentation where the target system and object 
manipulated may be said to be distinct: the case where the manipulation of a system X is 
designed to obtain information about a different system Y, via the information obtained 
about X. Experimental results about Y are then not the results of a manipulation of Y, no 
more than the results from a simulation using a model of Y. True. But when, for instance 
with the investigation of an astrophysical or climate system, simulation is said to be 
epistemic substitute for or epistemically on a par with experimentation, it is not substitute 
for experimentation on a physical system different from the astrophysical or climate 
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system. It is substitute for experimentation on the system that is simulated and that cannot 
be manipulated.  
So when the simulation of the system X is claimed to be ‘epistemically on a par’, it is 
with experimentation on and manipulation of X or a representative part of X. But in that 
case, experimentation has, contrary to simulation, a direct access to the target system, in 
the sense that the target system is the system that is manipulated in experimentation.  
3.2	  Both	  simulation	  and	  experimentation	  rely	  on	  models?	  
Experimentation, we conclude from the previous section, manipulates the target system 
of the investigation and in this sense has, by contrast with simulation, direct access to it. 
But that does not mean a direct access to the information about the system. Getting 
experimental information about the system that is manipulated is a complicated, delicate 
matter that involves preparation, control, calibration, interpretation of the results of the 
manipulation, not to speak of the selection and arrangement of these results. All these 
different aspects of experimentation involve theoretical background and assumptions 
about different elements of the experimental process, and thus rely on models. So just 
like simulation, experimentation involves reliance on models, that much is clear.  
Focusing on one particular use of models in experimentation, their use in measurement, 
Margaret Morrison argues that the similarity of the role of models leaves “little basis on 
which to epistemically differentiate the activities involved in some types of simulation 
and experimentation” (2009: 40). Taking epistemic differences to be differences in 
epistemic results, the claim looks like an objection against the idea of a difference in the 
epistemic functions of simulation and experimentation.   
Morrison’s strategy is not to deny that, in simulation, all that is manipulated is a putative 
model of the target system whereas performing measurements on the system involves an 
interaction with the system: “a measurement… bears some type of causal connection to 
the property being measured”(ibid p.52, italics added).  Rather, the role models play in 
measurements seems to make this interactive dimension of experimentation 
epistemologically irrelevant: 
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Experimental measurement is a highly complex affair where appeals to materiality 
as a method of validation are outstripped by an intricate network of models and 
inferences. (ibid p. 53) 
That models play a crucial role in measurement should be uncontroversial. That, 
however, leaves open the possibility that this role be epistemically different from the role 
it plays in simulation. But Morrison goes further in the function she assigns to models, 
speaking literally of models as measuring instruments.6  Her claim seems to be that the 
physical interaction between the target system and the instrument that takes place in 
experimentation makes no epistemological difference because experimentation, no less 
than simulation, consists in manipulating models. In what sense does experimentation 
consist in manipulating models?  
As a simple illustration let’s consider the wake again: suppose we are interested in how 
the shedding frequency, F, of the vortices behind the cylinder, depends on the velocity, 
V, of the flow before it reaches the cylinder, the upstream velocity. We are thus interested 
in F = f(V). Suppose the instrument used to measure the shedding frequency is a hot-wire 
anemometer. To put it simply, the sensible part of this instrument is a thin wire that 
undergoes a brief change in temperature as the local velocity of the flow is increasing.  
The state of the instrument is characterized by the temperature of the wire, T. We place 
the anemometer behind the cylinder, on the way of the vortices traveling downstream 
with the flow. The periodic change in local velocity, v, due to the emission of vortices 
will then cause an alternating variation in the temperature of the wire. The use of the 
instrument relies on a relation between v and T: v = g(T) so as to produce, as an outcome 
of the measurement, the local velocity v. As the value of the upstream velocity V is 
changed, the values of T and v change, and the relation v = g(T) goes from one realization 
to another, in the same way as happens when a model is run in a simulation. And, for the 
simulation, we did talk of the manipulation of the model described by the equation 
implemented. So experimentation could be seen as well as the manipulation of a model, 
the model of the instrument(s). The question now is whether this manipulation of the 
model is really all what matters to the epistemic function of experimentation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  view	  of	  models	  as	  measuring	  instruments	  see	  also	  Boumans	  2005.	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With a simulation, the simulationist intervenes on the model directly by choosing the 
input, which are the initial values for the constants and parameters. In experimentation 
the input of the model, e.g. the temperature of the wire in the anemometer, is the state of 
the target system. This state itself results from the initial conditions that were fixed by the 
experimenter when she chose a value for V. The experimenter does not intervene directly 
on the model; she intervenes on the system. And via the effect the system has on the 
instrument, and the model representing the relation between this effect and its cause, she 
finds out about this cause, which is the state of the system resulting from the intervention 
on the system. In experimentation, the model is then intervened on by the system and the 
output of the model, the outcome of measurement, tells us how it was intervened on, e.g. 
what was the value of v, the local velocity, resulting from the experimenter’s intervention 
on V, the upstream velocity. So it is certainly true that the experimenter makes crucial 
use of the effect of an intervention on/manipulation of the model. But how the model is 
intervened on/manipulated seems to make all the difference with regards to what we can 
learn from the use of the model. The experimenter using a model of an instrument is not 
interested in learning about the behavior of the model given a certain input. It is assumed 
that she knows how the instrument works, how it behaves under given conditions. She 
wants to learn about the input to which the instrument, or its model, ‘reacts’. Because in 
experimentation, this input, the source of the intervention on the model, is the state of the 
target system, the manipulation of the model is a means to learn about the state of the 
target system. And if this state of the target system is solely the effect of the intervention 
on the target system, then the manipulation of the model is also a means to learn about 
the relation between this intervention on and the resulting state of the target system.  
Morrison’s examples of experimentation are different in that the model used to make the 
measurement is the model of the whole target system, e.g. a model of the pendulum, 
rather than a model of a probing instrument. But the same reasoning applies. The case 
considered is the experimental measurement of the value of some constant that figures in 
the model of the physical target system, like the value of the gravitational constant. As 
Ron Giere (2009) notes, however, the measurement procedure supposes that the 
pendulum interacts causally with the Earth’s gravitational field. We learn something 
about the environment by having the model intervened on by the environment and by 
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having this intervention satisfy specific conditions. So in this case or in the previous one, 
in spite of the use of a model, the material interaction in experimentation does seem 
epistemically relevant.  
Admittedly, we ‘know’ of the features of the system that affect the instrument only in so 
far as we ‘know’ of the relation between these features and the state of the instrument, 
that is, only in so far as we have and are justified in using a given model of the 
instrument. But to say that this mediating role of model makes causal interaction in 
experimentation epistemically irrelevant looks like saying that the role of language in 
expressing our sensory experience makes the sensory character of this experience 
epistemically irrelevant.  
It is also true that materiality is not unique to experimentation. The reliability of 
experimentation results depends on having a proper functioning of the instrument and 
proper conditions of its use; the reliability of the simulation results depends on the proper 
functioning of the computer in which the simulation is implemented. A discussion of the 
role of materiality in simulation is beyond the scope of this paper but it is worth noting 
some differences between the contribution of materiality to the epistemic functions of 
simulation and experimentation. In experimentation, the material conditions are essential 
to the interpretation of what we learn. Depending on where we position the anemometer 
the outcome produced might have to be interpreted differently, be the measurement of V 
or the measurement of v. How we measure is essential to what we measure. In a 
simulation, when everything goes well it seems that materiality becomes, in principle, 
epistemically transparent7. This is why we can talk of manipulating the model, rather than 
the computer. This is also why, as we will see in the next section, in experimentation, 
material ‘errors’ may be instructive about the system under study: from inconsistent 
results, we may learn, for instance, about the existence of a new factor, a new feature of 
the system. From a material flaw in simulation, we do not learn about the target system.  
The two arguments that were just examined called into question the idea of 
experimentation as direct access to the system under study. They fall short however of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  to	  say	  that	  what	  computer	  is	  used	  for	  the	  simulation	  will	  not	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  what	  results	  can	  be	  produced.	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showing that there is no basis for some general epistemic difference between simulation 
and experimentation. To get a better understanding of what these epistemic differences 
are we need first a better understanding of what the respective epistemic targets are. 
4.	  Real	  (epistemic)	  difference	  
This section will focus on the epistemic targets of simulation and experimentation, that is, 
the epistemic results that experimentation and simulation are respectively designed to 
produce about a given target system, and the difference between these epistemic targets. 
4.1	  Epistemic	  target	  in	  experimentation	  
Part of the epistemic result of experimentation is the measurement of the values of 
quantities characterizing the target system. But the characterization of the epistemic 
target of scientific experimentation must also include the objectives of 1) reliability and 
2) formal generalization. 
One condition for the reliability of measurements is that experimental outcomes be 
reproducible. But not any reproducibility will do. Results on gravitational waves were 
claimed to be reproducible, but the conditions in which they were reproducible were not 
the ‘right’ conditions. What the right conditions are is neither always clear from the 
outset nor written in stone. It is rather typical of ‘exploratory experimentation’8 that it 
aims at specifying what they are.  
Both the experimental investigations introduced earlier, on the wake formed behind a 
cylinder and the Wason task, illustrate this aim. In the former, experimentation aimed to 
determine how the shedding frequency of the vortices forming the wake evolves when 
the upstream velocity of the flow increases. Two different forms of evolution were found, 
both being reproducible. It took a 30-year long controversy to identify which, if either, 
was the right one, the reason being that it was not clear what factors were responsible for 
the difference between these two forms of evolution. Depending on which factor is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  exploratory	  experiment	  and	  theory-­‐testing	  experiment,	  see	  Steinle	  2002.	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responsible, the effect will count as genuine, intrinsic, or as interference. The controversy 
ended with the identification of the factor responsible for the effect (Williamson 1989).9 
In the Wason task experiments, the object of investigation is the ability to use conditional 
reasoning. Given the rule: “if there is a vowel on one side then there is a even number on 
the other side”, and the task of testing it, it is expected that a proper understanding of the 
conditional will lead to the choice of turning over the card with a vowel and the card with 
an odd number. These are the two choices that could falsify the rule: if there is a vowel 
on one side, there must be an even number on the other face. If there is an odd number on 
one face, there should not be a vowel on the other face. 
Experimental results always show this response as only one of those displayed by the 
subjects and not the most frequent one. A common explanation of the results is in terms 
of correct vs. incorrect understanding of the material conditional. A recent experimental 
study argues, however, that some differences in the exact terms of the formulation (e.g. 
‘testing’ vs. ‘falsifying’) can have an influence on the reaction to the task that has been 
overlooked by previous studies (Stenning and van Lambalgen 2001). If that is correct, the 
conditions of reproducibility of the results are not those in which most studies were 
conducted since in these conditions, this semantic factor was ignored and had a non-
measured effect on the result. The conditions of reproducibility must have all the factors 
having an influence on the effect of interest be under control: either fixed, if they are part 
of the background conditions, or systematically varied and measured if their influence is 
relevant to the investigation of the effect. Reproducibility must be in the right conditions: 
conditions that properly distinguish the background from the factors that are causally 
relevant. 
When a complex phenomenon is investigated, the aim of the experimentation is then, 
first, given a certain variable of interest, to identify the factors causally relevant to its 
evolution, the relevant parameters, and measure their effect. This phase aims at a 
measurement of the behavior of the system of interest. But the aim of experimentation is 
also to go from the data that are collected to relations between variables of interest and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  case	  study	  see	  Peschard	  2011.	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relevant factors that these data instantiate. It is to go from the data to the phenomenon.10 
The information that experimentation aims to produce about this system, the target 
system, is the structural pattern, the phenomenon, that its behavior instantiates. If the aim 
only were the behavior of the system, reproducibility of the measurement would not be 
such an issue. More precisely, the distinction between the background and the relevant 
factors would not be an issue. Reproducibility in the right conditions is required because 
what is at stake in experimentation is neither the behavior of this or that target system, 
nor the pattern that only this or that target system instantiates. It is the structural pattern 
that any system that is relevantly similar to the target system instantiates.  
The behavior of the system manipulated, as particular instantiation of a structural pattern 
is, in general, only an intermediary or preliminary epistemic target for experimentation. I 
will hereafter use the term epistemic target to refer to the structural pattern.  
When experimentation is used merely as a testing procedure, it may seem that the 
epistemic target is actually the behavior itself of the system manipulated, the instantiation 
of a pattern rather than the pattern instantiated. But one should remember that what is 
tested is a (theoretical) structural pattern, which would be instantiated not only by the 
system that is the object of measurement but by any system relevantly similar to it. And 
the measurement outcomes are epistemically significant in that they can be seen as the 
instantiation of a pattern that does or does not match the one that is under test.  
What about the epistemic target of the simulation? 
4.2	  Epistemic	  target	  in	  simulation	  
A simulation is the manipulation of a putative model of the target system S, that is, of a 
set of relations between some variable(s) of interest and parameters. Such a set of 
relations is what we just called a structural pattern. The results of the simulation are sets 
of values that satisfy these relations, that is, an instantiation of this pattern, corresponding 
to some initial conditions. Note the contrast: experimentation ultimately aims to elucidate 
the structural pattern that is instantiated by the evolution of the system manipulated; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  About	  the	  distinction	  between	  data	  and	  phenomena	  see	  e.	  g.	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  1988,	  McAllister	  1997,	  Feest	  2009.	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simulation aims to produce an instantiation (numerical instantiation) of the pattern that is 
manipulated.  
For experimentation, we made a distinction between the aim of measuring, the 
acquisition of data, and the ultimate aim of elucidating phenomena, structural patterns. 
We can make a similar distinction between two levels of aims for simulation. To produce 
an instantiation of the pattern that is manipulated is only a preliminary result. The 
ultimate epistemic target of the simulation is the evolution of some physical system S, the 
target system, in the physical conditions represented in the simulation. By learning how 
the structural pattern that is simulated is numerically instantiated, the simulationist aims 
to learn how it would be physically instantiated by a system correctly represented by the 
model. 
Granted, there are exploratory simulations, where no physical system, actual or even 
possible, is represented by the model run on the computer. In fact, in this case, just as in 
experimentation, there is no distinction between system manipulated and target system. 
There is no such distinction because the model plays both roles. Obviously, if no physical 
system is simulated, if there is no physical system in the role of target system, then the 
ultimate epistemic target of simulation cannot be the physical instantiation of the model 
manipulated. But it also means that we are outside the domain where the comparison 
between the epistemic functions of experimentation and simulation makes sense.  
This objection, however, suggests another one, more interesting. If we put aside for a 
moment the view of simulation as imitation, we can see that, like the experimenter, the 
simulationist is interested not just in the instantiation of a pattern but also in the pattern 
instantiated. We need to remember the two senses of simulation that we have 
distinguished earlier: in one sense, it is an imitation, but, in the other sense, it is the 
calculation of the solution of the algorithm implemented on the computer. The form of 
this solution is generally opaque to the simulationist (Lenhard 2006, Humphreys 2009). 
But this is what is instantiated by the data produced by the simulation. And beyond the 
data, the simulationist is interested in identifying the form of this solution, the pattern that 
the data instantiate. In addition, there is a compelling argument to be made that this 
pattern is not already somehow contained in the model used for the simulation. And that 
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enables one to say, that just like for experimentation, that simulation produces ‘new 
knowledge’ (Winsberg 2010).   
That both simulation and experimentation not only produce the instantiation of a pattern, 
the data, but aim at identifying the pattern instantiated in the data, certainly makes their 
epistemic functions and targets look very similar to one another. But if simulation is, as 
was mentioned early on, a form of experimentation, that should not be surprising. On the 
other hand, it underscores an essential difference between these results: the pattern that 
experimentation aims to uncover is the one that the evolution of the target system, and 
any system relevantly similar to it, in similar conditions, instantiates. The pattern that the 
simulationist aims to uncover is the one instantiated by the data produced during the 
simulation. The epistemic force of the distinction relies heavily on the argument made 
previously that in experimentation there is a direct access to the target system.  
“Models” as Robert Sugden (2002) writes, “are suggestions about how to set about 
explaining some phenomena in the real world. […] [T]hey are sketches of processes 
which, according to their creators, might explain phenomena we can observe in the real 
world”. Of course, the simulationist hopes, as Winsberg nicely puts it, that the simulation 
does imitate the evolution of the target system and that the pattern instantiated by the 
simulation data is the one instantiated by the evolution of the target system. And she will 
offer some reasons to make his cases. But all the simulation can show is how the system 
would evolve if it were the case that the only factors that make a relevant difference to 
this behavior are those represented in the model, assuming they interact in the way 
represented in the model.  
The results of the simulation are, putatively, actual claims about the model and 
counterfactual claims about the target system. By contrast, the results of the 
experimentation are, putatively, actual claims about the target system, which can be 
interpreted, as we will see, as counterfactual claims about the simulation.  It is this 
difference in the epistemic targets of simulation and experimentation that makes the use 
of simulation so productive even in a tandem configuration, where experimentation is 
possible. This difference makes possible a real epistemic co-operation between 
simulation and experimentation.  
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4.3	  Articulation	  of	  simulation	  and	  experimentation	  
Simulation and experimentation have different epistemic targets, i.e., they are designed to 
produce different kinds of epistemic results about a given target system. This difference 
should incite us to investigate more closely the way in which these activities co-operate. 
On the other hand, to look closer at this co-operation helps to make more precise the 
difference in their respective epistemic targets.  
If simulation and experimentation have different epistemic targets, simulation cannot 
serve, in the strong sense of the term, as an epistemic substitute for experimentation. The 
activities are not epistemically on a par. But the co-operation shows another way in 
which they are on a par: they are both for each other a source of information and of 
constraint. Again, an episode in the investigation of the wake will serve as brief 
illustration.  
The object of the investigation was the relation between the frequency with which the 
vortices forming the wake are emitted behind the cylinder and the control parameter 
(velocity of the flow before it reaches the cylinder). Experimental measurements 
produced conflicting results. Some showed a continuously linear evolution whereas 
others showed a discontinuously linear evolution. A simulation was finally conducted 
that showed a continuously linear evolution.11  
Granted some confidence in the basic structure of the model, the experimenter is 
informed about what the behavior of the target system would be, if the only factors that 
contribute to it were those represented in the model. Where the results from 
experimentation and simulation disagree, the experimenter is constrained to account for 
the difference in terms of factors not represented in the model used for the simulation. 
But the simulation does not produce information or constraints about what to do with 
these factors once they are identified: they might come to be regarded as part of the 
background, in which case they will have to be experimentally neutralized. But they 
might instead be deemed relevant to the understanding of the evolution of the target 
system, in which case, their effect needs to be systematically recorded. New experiments 
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  See Williamson 1989 for a historical overview of the investigation.	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on the wake identified a new factor that was not represented in the model, and it was 
successfully argued by the experimenter that it was a relevant factor. In the case of the 
Wason experiment, experimenters also argue that they have identified a factor that has an 
effect on the system and was not represented in the model used for the simulation 
(Stenning and van Lambalgen 2001).    
On the other hand, when a new relevant parameter is identified, the constraint for the 
simulationist is to integrate this new information about the target system into the model 
used for the simulation. The simulationist is informed about what the results of the 
simulation would be, were all the relevant factors taken into account by the model. In the 
process, the simulationist may discover that some assumptions made in the representation 
of the system were mistaken. In the case of the wake, the geometry built into the 
simulation was that of a flow around a disc, justified by the assumption that the physical 
system was ideally equivalent to a flow around an infinite cylinder. The new relevant 
factor identified in experimentation contradicted this assumption. Similarly in the Wason 
case, the simulation12 assumes a uniform interpretation of the terms in which the task 
presented to the subject is formulated. Experimenters claim that there are strong 
differences in the interpretation of these terms which influence the response to the task.  
Conclusion	  
If simulation is to qualify as substitute for experimentation, in the strong sense that was 
examined, the two should be able to produce the same epistemic results: they should have 
the same epistemic targets. If simulation can serve as a substitute when experimentation 
is not possible, it should be able to serve as a substitute as well in a tandem configuration, 
where experimentation and simulation have the same target system, S, and 
experimentation on this system is possible. But in this situation, it was argued, 
experimentation, by contrast with simulation, provides a direct access to S via causal 
interaction and, thereby, provide information about the state of S.  And it was anticipated 
that this difference would result in a difference in the epistemic results these activities are 
able to produce.  
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  a	  Bayesian	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  See	  Oaksford & Chater 2007.	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Two objections to the idea that experimentation provides a direct access to S were 
examined. One is that in experimentation just as in simulation, what is manipulated is 
only a system that stands in for the target system. This objection was answered by 
stressing two distinctions: one between the target system of the experimentation (system 
manipulated) and the system that might be its ‘epistemic motivation’ (e.g. a system in the 
field); the other one is between being a representation (as a model aims to be) and being 
representative (as a sample from a population aims to be). The other objection is that 
experimentation no less than simulation relies on models (models of instruments). The 
objection was answered by stressing the difference in the way in which the models are 
intervened on in each case. In experimentation, but not in simulation, the intervention 
comes from the target system itself via the physical relation between the state of the 
system and the state of the instrument.  
A closer inspection of the epistemic targets of simulation and experimentation brought 
forth a similarity between these two targets: in both cases, the target is not only the 
instantiation of a pattern (data) but the pattern instantiated by the data. That might be one 
additional reason why the two activities are sometimes said to be epistemically on a par. 
But in the light of the distinctions just pointed out this similarity is only a similarity. In 
experimentation, the pattern in question is the one that the evolution of the target system  
instantiates; in the case of simulation, it is the one instantiated by the data produced by 
the implementation of the model. So these activities are not epistemically on a par. But 
there is also an important way in which they are actually on a par. The difference in 
epistemic targets makes possible an epistemic co-operation and in this co-operation, both 
simulation and experimentation are, through their respective results, informing and 
constraining each other.  
 	  
REFERENCES	  
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988) Saving the Phenomena. The Philosophical Review  
97 (3): 303-352.  
Draft	  under	  review	   	   Isabelle	  Peschard	  July	  2010	  
	   24	  
Boumans, M. (2005). How Economists Model the World into Numbers. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Feest, U. (2009) What exactly is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized? Synthese, 
Online First, DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9616-7. 
Fox Keller, E. (2003) Models, Simulation and ‘Computer Experiments. In Radder 2003: 
198-215.  
Giere, R. (2009) Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation? 
Philosophical Studies 143: 59-62. 
Guala, F. (2003) Experimental localism and external validity. Philosophy of Science 70: 
1195-1205. 
Guala, F. (2008) Experimentation in economics. In U. Mäki (ed.), Elsevier Handbook of 
the Philosophy of Science, Volume 13: Philosophy of Economics.  Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Hartman, S. (1996) The World as a Process: Simulations in the Natural and Social 
Sciences. In R. Hegselmann et al. (eds.), Simulation and Modeling in the Social 
Sciences from the Philosophy of Science Point of View. Theory and Decision Library. 
Dordrecht:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 77-100. 
Humphreys, P. (1994) Numerical Experimentation. In P. Humphreys (ed.) Patrick 
Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Volume 2.Philosophy of Physics, Theory Structure and 
Measurement Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 103-118. 
Humphreys, P. (2009) The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods. 
Synthese 169 (3): 615-626. 
Krohs U. (2008) How digital computer simulations explain real-world processes. 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3): 277-292. 
Lenhard, J. (2006) Surprised by a nanowire: Simulation, Control and Understanding. 
Philosophy of Science,  73(5): 605-616. 
McAllister, J. (1997) Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis 47: 217–228. 
Draft	  under	  review	   	   Isabelle	  Peschard	  July	  2010	  
	   25	  
Morgan, M. (2003) Experiments without material intervention: Model experiments, 
virtual experiments and virtually experiments. In Radder 2003: 216-235. 
Morrison, M. (2009) Models, measurement and computer simulation: the changing face 
of experimentation.  Philosophical Studies 143: 33-57. 
Norton, S., and F. Suppe, (2001) Why atmospheric modeling is good science. In C. 
Miller & P. N. Edwards (eds.), Changing the atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and 
Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 67–105. 
Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to 
human reasoning.  Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 T. Ören, T. (2011) The many facets of simulation through a collection of about 100 
definitions. SCS Modeling and Simulation Magazine 2: 82-92. 
Parker, W. (2009). Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and 
Materiality. Synthese 169 (3): 483 - 496 
Peschard, I. (2011) Modeling and Experimenting.  In Models, Simulations, and 
Representations, New York: Routledge: 42-61 
Radder, H. (ed.) (2003) The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation. Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press. 
Steinle, F. (2002). “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science.” Perspectives on 
Science 10 (4): 408–432. 
Stenning, K. and M. van Lambalgen, (2001) Semantics as a foundation for psychology: a 
case study of Wason’s selection task. Logic, Language and Information, 10(3): 273-
317. 
 R. Sugden,  (2000) Credible worlds: the status of theoretical models in economics. 
Journal of Economic Methodology 7: 1-31. 
Varenne, F. (2010) Les simulations computationnelles dans les sciences sociales. 
Nouvelles perspectives en sciences sociales : revue internationale de systémique 
complexe et d'études relationnelles 5(2): 17-49. 
Draft	  under	  review	   	   Isabelle	  Peschard	  July	  2010	  
	   26	  
Wason, P. C. (1968) Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 20: 273-281. 
Williamson, C.H.K. (1989) Oblique and parallel modes of vortex shedding in the wake of 
a circular cylinder at low Reynolds number. Journal of Fluid Mechanics 206: 579-627. 
Winsberg, E. (1999) Sanctioning models: The epistemology of simulation. Science in 
Context 12 (20: 275-292. 
Winsberg, E. (2003) Simulated experiments: methodology for a virtual world. Philosophy 
of Science 70: 105-125. 
Winsberg, E. (2009) A tale of two methods. Synthese 169 (3): 575-592. 
Winsberg, E. (2010) Science in the age of computer simulation. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
